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Background: Although it has been two decades since the Thai Patent Act was amended to comply with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), there has been little emphasis given
to assessing the implications of this amendment. The purpose of this review is to summarize the health and
economic impact of patent protection, with a focus on the experience of Thailand.
Methods: A review of national and international empirical evidence on the health and economic implications of
patents from 1980 to 2009 was undertaken.
Results: The findings illustrate the role of patent protection in four areas: price, present access, future access,
and international trade and investment. Forty-three empirical studies were found, three of which were from Thai
databases. Patenting does increase price, although the size of effect differs according to the methodology and
country. Although weakening patent rights could increase present access, evidence suggests that strengthening
patenting may benefit future access; although this is based on complex assumptions and estimations. Moreover,
while patent protection appears to have a positive impact on trade flow, the implication for foreign direct
investment (FDI) is equivocal.
Conclusions: Empirical studies in Thailand, and other similar countries, are rare, compromising the robustness and
generalizability of conclusions. However, evidence does suggest that patenting presents a significant inter-temporal
challenge in balancing aspects of current versus future access to technologies. This underlines the urgent need to
prioritize health research resources to assess the wider implications of patent protection.Introduction
Access to information that is generated through research
and development (R&D) is a public good [1]. Because it
is impossible to exclude people from using it, a price that
reflects the actual cost of production cannot be charged.
To address this, patents present a legal system that pro-
vides short-term exclusivity (or monopoly rights) over
the production and sale of a specific product resulting
from R&D. This allows the firm to sell at a price higher
than would otherwise be the case, compensating the
costs of R&D. However, there is some concern that the
patent price is used to achieve ‘super-normal’ profits* Correspondence: inthira.y@hitap.net
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distribution, and reproduction in any medium(profits in excess of those required to recoup R&D costs)
at the detriment of wider access to patented products [2].
The implications of patenting spread further, as
innovation, technology, and knowledge development are
crucial drivers of economic development and technology
transfer resulting from international trade and invest-
ment. The topic of patenting has found its way onto the
global agenda due to the World Trade Organization
(WTO)’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which expanded the
Western tradition of patenting to all members of the
WTO. Under this Agreement, patent protection must be
available for at least 20 years, must be without discrim-
ination against the place of invention or origin of prod-
uct, and must apply to both products and processes [3].
This has generated especially heated debate within the
health community concerning the impact that patentsCentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
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ing both availability and affordability. However, argu-
ments concerning patenting tend to take one of two
sides: that patenting should be continually strengthened
to encourage greater trade and investment, or that
patenting should be weakened to ensure that medicines
are as cheap as possible in the belief that this will ensure
the greatest access for those in need. There is seldom, if
ever, consideration of both sides when informing policy
makers how to strike a balance between affordable medi-
cines, both now and in the future, and trade and invest-
ment. For instance, whilst continually strengthening
patenting will likely lead to higher prices, thus further
reducing access, weakening patenting may stifle long-
term access since pharmaceutical companies might be
reluctant to introduce new medicines into the market,
and foreign investors may look to invest in other coun-
tries where there is better protection of their products.
In order to determine the appropriate balance in policy
(such as the use of TRIPS-flexibilities), it is important
to establish: (i) the impact that patent protection has
on price; (ii) the impact that price has on current and
future access; and (iii) the impact that patents have
on innovation in national and international settings.
This paper addresses these issues through a review of
the literature concerning these areas, with a specific
focus on Thailand.
Patenting and Thailand
Thailand is a lower-middle-income economy with a
2007 per capita Gross National Income of US$3,400 and
a total population of 63.3 million [4]. Health services are
provided by both public and private insurance schemes,
with public insurance schemes covering 97% of the
population. In 2007, 72% of national health expenditure
was financed by public expenditure [5]. The prices of
medicines in Thailand are set mainly by market compe-
tition, with no policy related to price regulation [6].
In 1979, Thailand's Patent Act (B.E.2522) established
the first legal protection for inventions in the country,
although only process patents for pharmaceuticals
were originally covered. This Act was revised in 1992 to
introduce product patent protection for pharmaceutical
products (13 years ahead of TRIPS compulsory compli-
ance) [7].
The justification to amend the Thai patent law was to
interest multinational companies to invest in Thailand.
The other expected benefit of restricted patent protec-
tion in medicines is that this could increase domestic
capability and strengthen the local pharmaceutical
industry by the transfer of new technologies into the
country [8], as the aim of a patent is to encourage tech-
nology transfer. Although technology diffusion can take
place through a variety of channels that involve thetransmission of ideas and new technologies—such as
the imports of high-technology products, adoption of
foreign technology and acquisition of human capital
through various means—Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) was claimed as the most important channel for
technology transfer [9,10].
This revision coincided with the rise of HIV/AIDS as a
major health problem together with concern over the
rising costs of anti-retrovirals (ARV). For instance,
200 mg (100 capsules) of original efavirenz sold in 2006
at 3,192 baht per bottle, while a generic equivalent was
available at 1,292 baht [11]. A similar concern was
expressed over other new medicines, which were not
covered by the National Health Insurance system due to
their high price [12]. The Sub-committee on selecting
essential medicines under the National Health Insurance
schemes therefore proposed compulsory licensing for
seven patented medicines during 2006–2008 [13].
There were reactions from pharmaceutical companies.
For instance, Abbott Laboratories withdrew its registra-
tion application for 10 new medicines in protest of the
government use license on its product. These reactions
were not confined to the pharmaceutical industry. In
2007 the Office of the United States Trade Represen-
tative elevated Thailand’s ranking from the Watch List
to the Priority Watch List, indicating concerns over defi-
ciencies in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection
and enforcement [14], and announcing that privileges
under the Generalized System of Preferences would be
removed for three Thai products: gold accessories jewel-
lery, polyethylene terephthalate, and flat screen televi-
sion sets [15].
From the experience of pharmaceutical patent protec-
tion and associated policies during 1992–2008, it is
apparent that patent protection has both health and eco-
nomic consequences. A conceptual framework illustrat-
ing the broad implications of patent protection is
illustrated in Figure 1. Patent protection affects the price
of pharmaceuticals whereby price is a component in
determining affordability and therefore access to existing
medicines and industry investment in introducing or
developing new medicines. A higher price would hinder
access, but stimulate the development of new medicines
through a higher R&D budget enabling patients to bene-
fit from access to new medicines in the future. Patent
protection is also accompanied by foreign investment in
domestic facilities for the production of pharmaceuticals.
Finally, as indicated above, there are wider trade rela-
tionships that may be affected by patent decisions, and
which are not related to medicines at all.
Methods
To ensure a manageable review, inclusion criteria cov-
ered the study scope and the type of study.
Table 1 Keywords related to a research area
Areas Keywords
Patent policy Intellectual property rights, Patent protection, Patent
TRIPS, TRIPS Plus, TRIP flexibility, Free trade agreement
Trade agreement
Health Public Health, Health, Drug, Pharmaceutical, Medicine
Price Price, Budget, Profit, Revenue
Access Access, Afford/Affordability, Available/Availability
Innovation Innovation, Research and development/R&D, Incentive
New molecular entity, Invention
Economic growth Investment, Trade/International Trade, Foreign direct
investment/FDI, Economic growth
Figure 1 Conceptual framework of the implications of patenting on health and economic.
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Studies which assessed the implications resulting from
patent protection for pharmaceutical products and/or
processes, especially:
 the benefit and cost of patent protection for the
pharmaceutical industry
 the interplay between patents and the affordability
and availability of medicines
 the relationship between patents and new drug
development
 the implications of patent protection on the wider
economy, i.e. trade or foreign direct investment.
Types of studies
 Thai or English publications
 Research affecting any country
 Research articles, working papers or reports
 Research based on quantitative data (direct
observation or experiment)
The databases searched covered both health and eco-
nomic literature: Pubmed, Embase, Global health, Inter-
national Bibiography of Social Sciences (IBSS), ABI/
INFORM, and Econlit. The selected Thai databases were
the Health System Research Institute database, Journal
of Health Science, Thai thesis database, The Thailand
Research Fund, Thai Journal Citation Index Center, and
the Research Library of the National Research Council
of Thailand. Given the specific case study setting of
Thailand, the review of Thai literature also included
unpublished (grey) literature such as research reports,
Master’s dissertations, or Ph.D. theses. The dates of the
published studies (1980–2009) were set so as to ensure
the inclusion of all work conducted when the require-
ment of global standard patent protection was needed
as, since the 1980s, intellectual property has became an
important business tool, and new internationally-agreedtrade rules for intellectual property rights were seen
as a way to cope with the international economic
tension [16].
The keywords employed in search queries covered five
areas of interest: (i) patent policy, (ii) health, (iii) price,
(iv) access, and (v) economy. In each area, the related
keywords are identified in Table 1.
Results
Initial searches resulted in 4,012 abstracts, of which 61
were from Thai databases. Of these, 43 passed the inclu-
sion criteria, including only three from the Thai data-
bases. Papers were categorised into: (i) role of patent
on price, (ii) role of patented price on present access,
(iii) role of patented price on future access, and (iv) role
of patent on international trade and investment. Tables 2,
3, 4, 5, and 6 provide a brief summary of these empirical
studies.
Role of patent on price
Twelve studies, including two Thai studies, looked at the
effect of patents on price. Most of these studies focused
on the patent expiration effect in the USA. Patent pro-
tection appears to increase price by around 26%-277%
depending on which of the three estimation approaches
is used.
Table 2 Empirical studies of the implications of patenting on price
Authors/ Ref. no. Period Setting (Country/medicines) Objectives Model Method
Watal (2000)/[17] 1985-1992 India, 22 patentable medicines
in mailbox (varied in wide
therapeutic areas)
The effect of product patents,
price control and compulsory






the constant elasticity demand
and the linear demand
function—and estimating price
as a composite of the demand
function.
Fink (2000)/[18] 1992 India, two therapeutic groups:
quinolones and synthetic
hypotensives
The impact of product patents




Modeling a demand function
as a two-stage decision-making
process (chemical entity and
brands under that chemical
entity). Then estimating price
and profit under each substitution
elasticity among chemical entities
and among brands.
Boersma et.al. (2005)/[19] 1996 to 2001 The Netherlands, three medicines
whose patents expired between
1996 and 2001
To observe price and share prior
to and after patent expiration
Observational study Trend analysis of volumes and
price (measured as defined daily
doses (DDD) prior to and after
patent expiries were calculated
Suh et al. (2000)/[20] 1984-1987 USA, 35 chemical entities whose
patents expired between 1984
and 1987
The effect of generic medicine
entry on price after patent
expiration
Regression analysis Collecting descriptive statistics
of price after patent expiration
and analysing the influential
factors affecting price, which
are number of multiple-source
medicines, market growth,
market size, profitability, severity
of illness, duration of treatment,
and number of years after
patent expiration.
Magazzini et al. (2004)/[21] July 1987-December 1998
(Quarterly data)
USA, UK, Germany, and France,
all medicines whose patents
expired within the study period
Price and determinant of price
after patent expiry
Regression analysis Collecting descriptive statistics
of prices before and after
patent expiration. Using regression
of the price with control of market
share of the patented products,
market size, % of sales to the
hospital segment, the average
market growth, the number of
brand names, ratio of the average
price of original products, etc.
Grabowski and Vernon (1992)/[22] 1983-1986 USA, 18 expired patent medicines The pricing and competitive
behaviour after patent expiration
Regression analysis Using descriptive statistics of
price index of the overall market,
original medicine, and generic
medicine. Using regression of























Table 2 Empirical studies of the implications of patenting on price (Continued)
Griliches and Cockburn (1994)/[23] 1987-1990 USA, two anti-infective drugs:
cephalexin and cephradine
The pricing and competitive
behaviour after patent expiration
Observational study Calculating the aggregate price
indexes for a simple two-goods
world where consumers buy
either the brand or the generic
version of a drug.
Borrell (2007)/[26] 1995-2000 14 antiretroviral therapy medicines
in 34 low and middle income
countries.
The impact of patents on medicine
prices across developing countries
Regression analysis Developing a price function as
a composite function of the
number of medicines in patent
and non-patent regimes,
number of generics after patent
expiration, number of doses
per day, efficacy, adverse
reactions, and number of years
in the US market.
Supakankunti et. al. (1999)/[27] 1987-1998 Thailand, six therapeutic categories
were chosen to represent the
patented market
The effect of new patent law
on price
Observational study There were no patented
medicines so these medicines
were selected by other criteria.
Descriptive statistics were used
to report the price movement
or trend of the real price and
nominal price of branded and
generic medicines.
Limpananont et. al. (2004)/[28] 2001-2004 Thailand, antiretroviral therapy
medicines
Price differences of patented and
generic medicines
Observational study Comparing and calculating
the price ratio of patented and
generic DDD prices
Jones et al. (2001)/[29] 1981-1994 Canada, 82 medicines from the
British Columbia Pharmacare
Programme.
The impact of the Canadian
Patent Act in 1987
Regression analysis Using descriptive statistics of
prices before and after 1987
and log regression of generic
market share, one factor, to
predict market price.
Challu (1995)/’ [30] 1987- Italy, 38 medicines The impact of the 1978 patent
law change
Observational study Comparing new drug prices in
Italy before and after the 1978
































2000-2003 Thailand, top 70
imported medicines.
The implications of the
TRIPS-Plus proposal,
and extension of patent
life on price and access
Regression analysis
and Modelling
It was assumed that the
first medicine patent
expired in 2003. Drug
consumption and budget
from using generic were
estimated. This cost was
then compared with




2006-2008 Thailand, 7 government
use licensed medicines




use licenses on health





no. of patients with access
to government use license
medicines from the current
number of access and up to
5 years. The Markov model
was used to simulate the
heath impact. Trend analysis
of export and foreign
direct investment
was employed.









companies and their patent
agents to determine where
and how patentable
medicines in the essential
list of the WHO are now
patented in developing
countries
Borrell (2003)/[34] 1995-1999 34 low and middle
income countries,
HIV/AIDS medicines
The impact of patent
rights on medicine sales:
reducing or increasing.
Modelling Developing two simultaneous
relationships: (1) the
relationship between the
likely entry decision across
drug-country-year triplets
and patents; and (2)
the relationship between
market coverage (i.e. mean
coverage of patients with a
specific ARV drug) and patents
conditional on drug entry
decisions and patent regime.
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late price. This has been used to estimate the likely
effects of patents on the price of medicines not currently

















1982-2002 68 countries at all income
levels and including all
medicine launches over





and how quicsituation of those medicines being under TRIPS obliga-
tions. Using this methodology, Watal (2000) showed that
all patentable medicine prices in India would increase






Survey Surveying U.S. manufacturing firms in
order to know the proportion of its
inventions developed in 1981–83 that
would not have been developed and or
commercially introduced if it could






Probit model Using probit models of the probability
that a new medicine is launched in a
given country within either two years or
ten years of the medicine’s first
appearance in the global market and a
log-logistic hazard model of the time
path of country launches









patent policies (Bills C-22
and C-91) on medicine
expenditure and on R&D
activity
Modelling 1. Estimating the medicine expenditures
as a function of year dummies and lagged
public drug expenditures, while controlling
for a vector of other covariates that could
affect drug spending. 2.Estimating R&D
expenditure whose patent policy changed
as an influenced factor
Hughes et al.
(2002)/[43]
2001 USA The effect of patent
termination on current
and future patients
Modelling From models developed by various scholars
during 1987–2002, five step models were
estimated:1) the effect of patent termination
on total revenue, 2) the effect of total revenue
on R&D budget, 3) the effect of R&D budget
on new medicine development, 4) the effect
of new medicine on life year and 5) life year
in monetary term
Giaccotto C. et al.
(2005)/[44]
1980-2001 USA The effect of price control
policy on number of new
drugs
Modelling Estimating the decreased R&D budget as a
function of five main items (price, GDP,
foreign sales, dummy variables representing
the years for which the Kefauver-Harris
amendment and the Waxman-Hatch Act).
The value of forgone R&D was then used
to calculate the number of forgone drugs
by dividing with $802 million
(cost of R&D per drug)
Colleen
(2003)/[45]
1980-1990 USA, six compulsory
licensing (CL) medicines





Observing the rate of patenting and other
measures of inventive activity five years
before and after CL
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accounting for different products through trademarks
and advertising, Fink (2004) used this approach to esti-
mate that prices would increase by 30–277% if these
medicines came under patent protection [18].
This approach would be useful if the price elasticity of
demand is known and correct. For the pharmaceutical
market, the consumption decision commonly involves
participation by a physician and a third party payer (gov-
ernment or hospital committee). The consumer may or
may not play some part in the price payment, depending
on a country’s specific regulatory and reimbursement
regimes. The pharmaceutical market’s demand function
is thus often distorted, and a model based on price elas-
ticity of demand might not present a real world situation
of the complexity of the pharmaceutical market.
Second, the observation of price before and after
patent expiration is used to infer the price effect of
patent protection. Boersma et.al. (2005) illustrated
that—when there is no patent protection—prices gener-
ally fall by 50–70% [19]. Suh et al. (2000) showed a de-
cline to approximately 30% of the original price three
years after patent expiration [20]. Also, Magazzini et al.
(2004) showed that the price index decreased three
years after patent expiration by approximately 20% in
Germany and France while the UK price index was
stable [21]. Conversely, two US studies by Grabowski
and Vernon (1992) and Griliches and Cockburn (1994)showed that—following generic entry—an original prod-
uct can have an increase in price of 7% and 11% after
one year and two years respectively [22]. Another study
showed a 60% price increase three years after expiration,
while the generic price decreased by 30% [23]. These
increases may reflect increased advertising intensity once
the market protection of patenting has expired.
However, the effect in each country will differ since
each nation has a different health system in terms of
medical tradition, policy for financing and supporting
generic entry, and brand royalty of physicians, pharma-
cists and customers. The marketing strategy also differs
among pharmaceutical companies, who often spend
more heavily on the intensity of advertising once the pa-
tent has expired, which could explain at least some of
the post-patent price increase. It appears that medicine
prices, in general, depend on several supply and demand
factors. For example, therapeutic advantage and number
of substitutes are both significant price determinants; as
the number of substitutes increased in one study from
one to two, there was an average 38% decline in the ratio
of the new drug price to the average existing market
price [24]. Kanavos and Vandoros (2011) also found that
product age has a significant and negative effect on
prices [25].
Third, studies perform regression analysis of factors
influencing medicine prices, of which patent is one such
factor. Borrell (2007) estimated patent impact on price
able 6 Empirical studies of the implications of patenting on economic growth and/or foreign direct investment
uthors/Ref. no. Period Setting Objectives Model Method





Estimating benefit from trade in
goods and the benefit to the
economy as a whole by matching
the industries that have higher
revealed comparative advantage
(RCA) index
errantino (1993)/[48] 1982 U.S. firm, U.S. affiliated
in 45 countries
The effect of IPR on
trade and investment
flows
Gravity model Using dummy (0/1) variables to
reflect differences in national IPR
protection schemes and control
for economic risk (distance, phone,
landlocked, colony and European
countries), political risk (Paris
Convention member, restriction
to foreign firm, number of
international memberships,
duration of patent), labour costs,
population and GDP, while
dependent variables are total






The effect of IPR
protection on
trade flows
Regression Using an empirical model in
which deviations of bilateral
sectoral imports from anticipated
levels are related to income,
trade barriers, and patent laws
raga and Fink (1999)/[53] 1989 89 countries from
developed to least
developed countries
The effects of increased
protection on
intellectual property
Gravity model Using a gravity model of bilateral
trade, foreign direct investment,
and technology licensing and
estimating the effects of increased
protection on a cross-section of
89x88 countries. Using the index
on national IPRs systems
developed by Park and Ginarte
(1996). Estimating the effects of
explanatory variables (such as IPRs,
GDP and population of both
countries, geographical distance, a
common border, language)




Gravity model Using a gravity model consisting
of GDP of the importing country,
distance, trading bloc dummy,































Table 6 Empirical studies of the implications of patenting on economic growth and/or foreign direct investment (Continued)
Kondo (1995)/[52] 1976-1980 U.S. outward
FDI in 33
countries
The effect of patent
protection on FDI
Survey (for IPR index) and
Multiple regression of FDI
testing
Developing their own patent
index including scope, patent life,
and provision from weighted
point survey firm. Then using
control factors of GDP per capita,
population, education, English




1994-1995 The location choices of
French firms in 17
developing countries
The role of the patent
rights in the host country
A conditional
logit model
The independent variable is the
decision to invest in the countries.
The independent variables are
number of French competitors,
number of subsidiaries, openness,
GDP, GDP per capita, consumer
price index, status of EU union,
national R&D investment over
GDP, education, democracy,
corruption, patent protection
index (Ginarte and Park index),
and dummy variable of the
exceeding patent protection
index.





plants during the period
1981–1996
The impact of IPRs protection
compared with country risk
on the determinants of international
activity through wholly owned
operations, joint-ventures and
technology licensing,
OLS, Tobit and GLS random
effect
Independent variables are income
per capita, population, weighted
distance of country, averaged years
of schooling among the total
population, (exports + imports)/
GDP, global index of risk, composite
index of risk (political, financial and
economic), dummy variables for
number of scientists and engineers
per million of population, time




1995 and 2000 U.S. FDI and US FDI in
industrial level in 166
countries
The relationship between IPR
protection and overall FDI and
by industry
Gravity model regression Finding FDI determinants through
a regression of FDI on GDP per
capita, population, distance to
U.S., the cost of living abroad,
average years of schooling and
IPRs index using Ginarte-Park for
the year 1995 and World Economic
Freedom (WEF) index for the year
2000. Testing the industry
characteristics by adding industry
























Table 6 Empirical studies of the implications of patenting on economic growth and/or foreign direct investment (Continued)
Lee and Mansfield
(1996)/[57]
1991 U.S. firms and investment
in 14 developingcountries
The effect of IPR protection
level on U.S. firm’s FDI and the
role of IPRs protection in chemical
industry
1. Survey for IPRs protection
perception 2. OLS regression
3. Tobit model for chemical
industry
Surveying perceived weakness of
IPR protection from 94 US firms
and developing two regression
models to find the influence of
IPR protection level for overall US
FDI and level of technology
transfer in the chemical industry.
For OLS of overall US FDI,
independent variables are
weakness of IPR, size of market,
with control for firm specific and
country specific, IPR index, market
size, dummy for Mexico, FDI in
previous year, degree of
industrialization, openness, and
time dummy variables. For Tobit
model from 14 US chemical
industries, the independent variables
are the percentage of firms that
felt weakness of IPR protection, GDP,
and dummy variables for firms, while
the dependent variable is the
percentage of firms that will invest
in facilities for sales and distribution.
An et al. (2008)/[58] 1995 (for FDI or licensing)
and 1994 (for exporting)
U.S. FDI in 52 manufacturing
industries invested in 62 host
countries
To examine the effect of
strengthening IPR protection
on the mode of technology
transfer: exporting, FDI or licensing
A multinomial logit model
of three mode of entry
choices
The explanatory variables covering
national characteristics, GDP,
absorptive capacity, distance,
cultural distance (English and index
developed by authors), FDI fixed
cost (economic freedom index),
market capitalisation and investment
cost index, and IPR index from
Ginarte and Park 1990. The industry
characteristics variables are industry
R&D intensity and capital intensity
(the ratio of total real capital stock
to total industry sales).
Maskus (1998)/[59] 1989-1992 U.S. FDI in 46 countries The effect of patent protection on U.S.
patent applications filed in host
country, total sales of foreign affiliates
of U.S. parents, U.S. exports shipped
to affiliates and total assets, foreign
affiliates of U.S. parents
Seemingly Unrelated
Regression
Estimating a simultaneous set of
equations to capture these joint
impacts, controlling for market size,
tariff protection, the level of local
R&D by affiliates, distance from the
US, investment incentives
(proportion of affiliates receiving
tax concession numbers in host
country and in any of the countries)
and disincentives (proportion of
affiliates that employ a minimum
amount of local personnel no. in
























Table 6 Empirical studies of the implications of patenting on economic growth and/or foreign direct investment (Continued)
Javorcik (2004)/[60] 1995 1,405 global firms investing in
Eastern European countries
The impact of intellectual property
protection on the volume of FDI
Survey and Probit model A questionnaire of decision to
invest in any country and mode
of entry was developed. Using a
Tobit regression of the decision
and mode of entry on GDP per
capita, population, corporate tax
rate, legal effectiveness, corruption,
privatization, openness, the overall
progress in reform, effectiveness of
the legal system, corruption level,
privatization policies and openness
to trade. For testing the mode of
entry, the author included firm
specific variables such as firm sales,
R&D outlays as a percentage of
net sales, selling, general &
administrative expenses as a
percentage of net sales, the number
of four-digit SIC codes describing a
firm’s activities and a dummy
variable of each investor’s regional
experience in the region before 1989.
Du et al. (2008)/[61] 1993-2001 6,288 US firms investing in
various regions of China
The impacts of four economic
institutions variables, including
property rights protection, the
degree of government intervention
in business operations, the degree of
government corruption and contract
enforcement, on the location choice
of foreign direct investment
Discrete choice model A survey was conducted of private
enterprises in China to create
three indexes which are the
degree of government intervention
in business operations, the degree
of government corruption, and
contract enforcement. The other
concerned variables are the
agglomeration, dummy for
presence of US Embassy or
Consulates and dummy for
government promotion policies,
wages, infrastructures (length of
highway per square kilometre in
a region), and education (percent
of higher education students
in the region). IPR index is the
























Table 6 Empirical studies of the implications of patenting on economic growth and/or foreign direct investment (Continued)
Kawai (2009)/[62] 1998-2006 1,839 Japanese manufacturing
firms investing in China
The determinants of Japanese
manufacturing firms’ location
decisions in China
A conditional logit model Empirical models were developed
and tested. The dependent variable
is choice of investment (1 = Yes,
0 =No). The independent variables
are natural logarithms of the
number of Special Economic
Zones, IPRs index, natural logarithm
of the share of total investment in
fixed assets by state-owned units
in relation to total investment, GDP,
labour costs, road infrastructure
and natural logarithm number of
Japanese manufacturers All
explanatory variables are lagged by
one year.
Seyoum (2006)/[63] 1990 and 1995 63 countries The impact of patent protection FDI The OLS regression Using the set of independent
variables which include patent
index by Ginarte and Park (1997)
and controlling other variables such
as market size, GDP growth,
exchange rates, population,
corruption, unemployment, trade/
GDP, scientists and engineers, GDP
growth
Lesser (2002)/[64] 1998 FDI in 44 developing countries The effects of stronger IPR protection
in the areas of imports and Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI)
Multiple regression The variables includes income per
capita, past FDI, exchange rates,
tariffs, the proportion of previous
year FDI to GNP of pervious year,
and the degree of industrialization.
A new index was developed that
uses membership in international




1960–1990 60 countries from developed
to least developed countries
The impact of IPR protection on
economic growth (GDP growth)
Regression Creating an IPR index and
estimating a system of equations
to identify the effect of IPR
protection and other national
characteristics on economic growth





























168 US-based MNEs that have
invested internationally
(42 countries)
The determinants of the international
location of R&D activity by foreign
affiliates of US-based MNEs
Regression analysis Included control variables are real
GDP, distance, percentage of
domestic sales in total affiliate
sale turnover, technology intensity
index, R&D personnel per million
population, wages of technical
personnel, tax incentives for firm-
level R&D activities, intellectual
property rights index (from World
Economic Forum, Global
Competitiveness Report), capital
stock of US firms, an index of
R&D potential of output mix,
dummy variables for developing
countries other than NICs, newly
industrialized countries in East Asia,
financial crisis dummy, and vector
of time dummy variables
lyde and Acea (2003)/[67] 1985, 1990 and 1995 The sources of FDI are 19
OECD countries and 40
countries as the recipients
of FDI, 8 of which are from
Latin America.
The inflows of foreign direct investment
of Latin America and developing
countries after TRIPS
The gravity model The independent variables are GDP
per capita, population, dummy of
common language, past colonial
links and region, distance between
countries, Ginarte-Park IPR index
upakankunti et al.
2001)/[70]
1988-1998 Thailand The impact of patent law change in
1992 on FDI in Thailand
Observation Providing the trend of FDI for
industry in general and specifically
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countries which have different patent regimes, where pa-
tent was eligible or ineligible between 1995 and mid-
2000. This showed that combination therapy containing
at least one patented medicine is on average priced 70%
higher than combination therapy containing only generic
alternatives. Combination therapy containing at least
one original medicine is priced 16% higher than local
copies even when it is introduced in to no-patent
regimes [26].
In Thailand, the introduction of product patent pro-
tection in1992 seems to have had no effect on the price
of patentable medicines that were in the market before
1992 [27]. Rather, the effect appears to concern only
those patented medicines which were introduced subse-
quently. For example, one study compared the price of
patented and generic HIV/AIDS medicines from 2001–4
and found that the patented price was approximately
1.5-3 times higher than the generic price in 2001 [28].
The experiences in Canada and Italy reflect the situ-
ation in Thailand. A study of the impact of the 1987
Canadian Patent Act, which extended the period of pro-
tection from seven to ten years while also allowing the
generic industry to implement compulsory licensing,
found that after 1987, medicine prices increased relative
to pre-1987 prices [29]. Similarly, after a patent law in
Italy came into effect in 1978, new medicine prices were
163% higher than new drug prices before 1978 [30].
Role of patented price on present access
Empirical evidence directly linking patented price and
access is rare. Most studies describe how patenting
increases prices (as above) and then assume that price
affects access, but there is a lack of direct association
between the extent of price increase and the extent
of changes in access, controlling for other influence
factors. As shown in Table 3, there were four studies
found concerning this issue, two of which are in the
Thai setting.
Akaleephan et al. (2009) examined the effect of patent
life extension from a TRIPS-Plus proposal on access to
medicines. They illustrated the drawbacks of extending
the period of protection by showing that the availability
of generics would help to save 105% of actual govern-
ment expenditure, and accessibility would increase by
54% [31]. In addition, after compulsory license introduc-
tion in Thailand, the price of generic medicines was
about 3–38% of their original price. As a result, there
were approximately 8,000 extra patients utilizing EFV,
and it is estimated that the increased number of patients
with access to EFV will be 17,959 in five years [32].
Conversely, Attaran (2004) suggested that the main
obstacles are associated with the country’s socio-economic
status, such as the lack of manufacturing capacity or poorhealth care systems [33]. His survey results show that only
17 from a total of 319 medicines on the WHO Essential
Medicines List are protected by patents. In addition,
Borrell and Watal (2003) showed that switching all medi-
cines under a patent regime to a no patent regime globally
would have increased the percentage of AIDS patients
with access to new medicines from 0.88% to 1.18% [34].
However, with reference to individual countries, the
findings suggested different magnitudes of impact. For
example, in Thailand where most of the relevant medicines
were under patent, it was estimated that around 10,000
additional prescriptions would be prescribed if all patents
were waived, generating an increase in access of some 50%.
Role of patented price on future access
Incentive to introduce medicine to market
Pharmaceutical companies may refuse to market new
medicines in response to weak national patent policy
[35,36]. Mansfield (1986) estimated that 65% of products
would not have been introduced if patent protection
could not have been obtained [37]. While patents make
local markets more attractive, multinationals may delay
or avoid launching medicines in lower-priced countries
because they are concerned about the implications for
pricing in other markets [38]. For instance, Lanjouw
(2005) determined the effects of patent policy and price
control policy on market entry, and showed that exten-
sive price control and process-only patent protection
lowers the probability of having a new medicine in
lower-income countries by 30% [39]. A brief summary of
these two studies is shown in Table 4.
The model employed in these two studies was multi-
country, from high-income to low-income countries.
Although the results are more generalized, they some-
times mislead. Under some circumstances and model
assumptions, patent protection has a positive effect for
some countries, while under other circumstances it has
a negative effect. Single country studies are particularly
effective at maximizing their explanatory leverage by
exploiting the availability of comparable units of analysis,
whether over market or medicine characteristic varia-
tions within a country [40].
Incentive to invent new medicine
One implication of removing patent protection to gain
increased current access is that this might result in
patients foregoing the opportunity to receive a new
medicine in the future, as it would not be discovered or
developed [41]. There were four studies looking at this
possibility, as shown in Table 5. Grootendorst (2007) illu-
strated that this clearly generates trade-offs between bene-
fits now and in the future [42]. Indeed, heavily depending
on assumptions, Hughes et al. (2002) estimated that for
every dollar in consumer benefit realized from providing
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would be harmed at a rate of three dollars in present
value terms from reduced future innovation [43].
Giaccotto C. et al. (2005) investigated the role of price
control on new medicine development, showing that
price control policy in the USA during the 1980s
resulted in forgone R&D investment of US$264-293 mil-
lion, translating into 330–365 fewer new medicines,
which is equal to one-third of all actual new medicines
launched on the global market during that time period
[44]. However, such studies lack a direct link between
profitability and actual investment in R&D. They illus-
trate the effect of patents on profit and assume that this
translates directly into R&D. Conversely, an observation
of the innovation activities of pharmaceutical companies
affected by compulsory licensing found that there was
no uniform decline in the rate of medicine patenting
and other measures of inventive activity by companies
affected by compulsory licenses [45] Table 5.
Role of patent protection on international trade
and investment
With respect to the broader impact, in a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) between Thailand and the US, one
of the 23 negotiation issues was TRIPS-Plus, which
requires a higher level of intellectual property protection
than existed in the TRIPS agreement [46]. Five studies
focusing on the impact of patents on trade were found.
Based on a Computable General Equilibrium model, it
was estimated that the FTA would increase the export
and import levels of Thailand by 3.4% and 4.7%, respect-
ively [47]. This study also found, at the international
level, that IPR protection had a positive influence on
overall trade flows for both small and large developing
economies [48-50]. These results are in line with other
findings which show that patent protection had a posi-
tive impact on Indian pharmaceutical exports [51].
Intellectual Property Protection and investment
Nineteen studies, including one Thai study, looked at
the effect of patents on FDI. Most of these studies used
regression to analyze the effect of IPRs on FDI. Add-
itional variables are included in the regression to control
the differences in country specific factors. Their main
similarity is in comparing IPR risk along with economic
risk and/or political risk. Proxy indicators were used
to represent economic or political risk. Most of these
focused on the role of the national patent protection
policy to attract US investors.
Six empirical studies found that patent rights protec-
tion does not influence the location choices of foreign
investors. Some regression analyses of FDI in the 1980s
based on research by Ferrantino (1993), Markus and
Penubarti (1995), Kondo (1995), and Braga and Fink(1999) found no significant link between IPR protection
and FDI [48,52,53]. Using FDI data from the 1990s, the
above results were again confirmed in the study of
Pfister and Deffains (2005) who investigated the role of
patent protection on the location choices of French
firms investing in 17 developing countries [54]. In
addition, the Fosfuri’s (2004)’s study, which focused spe-
cifically on the chemical industry and accounted for the
differences of country characteristics, did not find that
IPR protection played a significant role in fostering
international activity [55].
However, some studies revealed that the volume of
FDI in a country tends to be inversely related to the
weakness of IPR protection. Five studies looking at the
FDI determinants of US Multinational Enterprises
(MNEs) were found. The results show that the strength
of IPR protection has a significant positive impact on
the U.S. FDI [56]. For example, a one percent rise in the
perceived weakness of IPR protection would decrease
the U.S. FDI in that country by 14%. In a sample
of chemical firms, it was found that firms are likely to
allocate their investment to sales and distributions
and simple production activities rather than to manufac-
turing final products or to R&D facilities [57]. This is
confirmed in another study [58], in which it was sug-
gested that a one percent rise in the extent of patent
protection would increase the U.S. investment in that
country by 0.45% [59].
Javorick (2004) indicated that weak protection of intel-
lectual property rights deters foreign investors in four
technology-intensive sectors: (1) drugs, cosmetics and
health care products; (2) chemicals; (3) machinery and
equipment; and (4) electrical equipment. In addition,
foreign investors, in all industries, tend to set up distri-
bution facilities rather than engaging in local production
in a country with weak IPR protection [60]. Four studies
confirmed that MNEs prefer investing in the regions
that have better intellectual property rights protection
[61-63]. For example, a one point increase in IPR index
would boost FDI by $1.5 billion [64].
Three studies using regression analysis yielded incon-
clusive results when analyzed in subgroups. Two studies
showed the positive impact of strong national patent
laws in developed countries, but showed a negative
impact in developing countries [65,66] while another
study revealed the converse results [67].
In terms of the pharmaceutical industry specifically,
a strong patent system was found to have caused a con-
siderable flow of investment into the American pharma-
ceutical industry [68]. However, some studies show a
negative correlation between the levels of protection and
foreign investment. This is supported by conclusions
elsewhere that the exclusion of pharmaceuticals from
patent protection was a significant factor leading Italy to
Figure 2 Availability of empirical evidence and direction of the relationship.
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generic medicines [69]. Supakankunti (2001) showed
that in Thailand there has been little foreign investment
in the pharmaceutical sector since the introduction of
the strengthened patent law in 1992 [70]. It has been
suggested that this is because foreign investors consider
Thailand an unsuitable destination due to the insuffi-
ciency of well-trained human resources, technology, and
equipment, as well as the inadequacy of the registration
system for new medicines [8] Table 6.
In conclusion, there are a number of empirical investi-
gations pointing to an uncertain relationship between
patent and FDI distribution, which depends on the polit-
ical and business risks of the country included, FDI
sources, data from opinion surveys or secondary data,
and the approach used to calculate the level of patent
protection scale. The question of just how important
patent protection is for FDI is still unsettled. Some
evidence indicates that patents have had a positive
impact on FDI overall and the pharmaceutical industry
in particular, while other evidence suggests that weak
patent protection of pharmaceuticals was the main
factor in making the country a manufacturing base for
these pharmaceutical companies. As both country-
specific and regional factors influence the effect of
patents on FDI, more regional and country–specific
studies should be conducted in order to validate the
findings of this study. As noted by Lesser (2002), the
effect of IPR on FDI may only be possible on a country-
by-country basis.
Conclusions
The empirical literature provides answers to some im-
portant questions related to the impact of patents, al-
though evidence remains largely inconclusive. With
respect to patent impact on price, both Thai and inter-
national evidence confirm that patenting shifts prices up
and has an effect on the price of the new registration
of medicines. In terms of present access, internationalempirical evidence demonstrates that patent protection
does not always impede access, whereas a Thai study
suggested that implementing a limited patent life may
actually increase access. As for future access, evidence
suggests that strengthening patent policy in a given
nation may speed up the time required for entry into the
pharmaceutical market. Empirical models estimate that
higher profits, from patents, would increase the number
of new medicines to market through higher R&D bud-
gets, enabling patients to benefit from access to new
medicines in the future. Conversely, one observational
study revealed that withdrawing exclusive rights by com-
pulsory licensing might not have an effect on innovation
in the future.
The evidence found from this review confirms that
policy stimulating patent protection does have a positive
impact on trade flows. In terms of FDI, evidence pro-
vides inconclusive results, both generally and specific to
the pharmaceutical industry. Figure 2 summarizes exist-
ing evidence and the remaining gap, with an indication
of the relationship found from this review.
The review revealed that little empirical research has
been undertaken on the extent to which patent rights
affect health and economic factors. With respect to
health, the settings of the studies are very mixed across
therapeutic areas and medicines. The literature generally
shows that the size of impact varies wildly, depending
on which methods are employed in the studies. Current
evidence therefore makes it difficult for a country, such
as Thailand, to come to a conclusion on advice to
national policy makers who are to make decisions which
trade off health or access impacts with wider economic
issues. The high price of medicines may not be related
to patent rights. Furthermore, price may not be related
to access, either.
Recommendations
The trade-offs between patent protection, current and
future access to medicines, and related aspects of trade
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ical studies are relatively rare, especially in countries
such as Thailand. This underlines the urgent need to
prioritize health research resources to assess the impli-
cations of patent protection.
It is clear that evidence on the role of patent/price
on access, especially with respect to non-communicable
diseases, is scare, inconclusive, and problematic. This
suggests a more holistic assessment is required which
takes into account a country’s socio-economic status
and health care system when estimating patent impact
on access to medicine. The estimation of patent impact
on technology transfer through FDI should be con-
ducted on a country basis. In order to try and assess
whether, on balance, a country is better off with patent
policy related to health or not will require evaluating the
implications for current and future access to medicines,
and the wider national economy.
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